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I. INTRODUCTION
Pre-dispute mandatory arbitration agreements eviscerate the Seventh Amendment
right to trial by jury and the rule of law; however, this contractual waiver of judicial
process is expressly authorized by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA).2 Over the past
few decades the Supreme Court has stretched the contractual approach in application
of the FAA so that “mandatory arbitration clauses have become not merely favorites,
but darlings of the courts.”3 While it can be argued that little basis in contract law
exists to exempt mandatory pre-dispute agreements from general contract principles,
special contract rules peculiar to arbitration have developed concurrently over this
period of time.
General contract construction principles indicate that the party seeking to prove
the agreement bears the burden of proof. However, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly noted “that the party resisting arbitration bears the burden of proving that
the claims at issue are unsuitable for arbitration.”4 Further, the Court recently
expressly construed an ambiguous agreement in favor of arbitration by holding “we
should not, on the basis of ‘mere speculation’ [determine in advance] that an
arbitrator might interpret these ambiguous agreements in a manner that casts their

1
Advocacy Program Director and Visiting Associate Professor, Rutgers School of Law,
Camden, New Jersey.
2

9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994).

3
Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private: The Quiet Revolution in Contract Law, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 776 (2002).
4

See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 91 (2000) (referring to its
“prior holdings” on the burden of proof with regard to this rule of construction and holding
that the party resisting arbitration on grounds that it would be too expensive likewise “bears
the burden of showing the likelihood of incurring such costs”).

249

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2006

1

250

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:249

enforceability into doubt . . . .”5 These contract construction principles favoring
arbitration are doctrines unique to arbitration contract law and were cited last year by
a federal appellate court in affirming a motion to compel arbitration for race
discrimination claims.6
The arbitration contract award is likewise treated differently on appeal. Unlike
lower court awards, which can be successfully appealed for either errors of law or
significant misinterpretation of the facts, arbitral decisions are subject to a more
limited review and typically can be vacated on far more limited grounds.7
Arbitrators can and do enter awards that do not reflect application of the rule of
common law or even statutory law. The low rate of challenges to arbitral decisions
is due in part to the fact that once an arbitrator has issued an award it is quite difficult
to vacate.8
If the true purpose of Section 2 of the FAA is “to make arbitration agreements as
enforceable as other contracts, but not more so,”9 an argument can be made that,
when arbitration clauses are involved, federal courts have in effect gone beyond
promoting neutrality in contracting and have created a special class of “super
enforceable” contracts. These “super enforceable” arbitration agreements get the
“but more so” treatment as a result of the Supreme Court’s repeated interpretation of
the FAA in a manner to counter the judiciary’s historical mistrust of arbitration.10
This article first explores the Supreme Court’s initially reluctant application of
the FAA’s contract approach to enforceability of arbitration agreements which lasted
well into the early 1980s. It, then, examines federal preemption of state law and the
evolution of the arbitration contract as we know it today. Finally, it looks at the
application of defenses that exist “at law or in equity for the revocation of contracts ”
as applied over the past ten years following the Court’s decision in Doctor’s Assocs.,
Inc. v. Casarotto. This author examines a decade of decisional law and finds a new
doctrine of arbitration jurisprudence developing under the FAA that is sensitive to
the unique concerns raised by adhesion arbitration agreements. Whether the courts
are inappropriately stretching the unconscionability defense is matter of
speculation.11
5

Pacificare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401, 406-07 (2003) (compelling
arbitration of a RICO claim and permitting the arbitrator to decide in the first instance whether
the agreement barring “punitive damages” also barred the treble damages allowed under the
RICO statute).
6

See Booker v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc., 413 F.3d 77, 81 (D.C. Cir. 2005).

7

See generally Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953) (stating in dictum, “the
interpretations of the law by the arbitrators in contrast to the manifest disregard are not
subject, in the federal courts, to judicial review for error . . .”).
8

See generally Pierre Lalive, Enforcing Awards, in 60
319 (1984).

YEARS OF

ICC

ARBITRATION: A

LOOK AT THE FUTURE 317,
9

Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967).

10

See Allied-Bruce Terminex Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270 (1995).

11

STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION, AND
OTHER PROCESSES 265 (4th ed. 2003) (“Judicial receptivity to unconscionability arguments
suggests that courts, at least in the arbitration area, may be stretching the unconscionability
definition in order to invalidate arbitration agreements.”).
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II. ARBITRATION HOSTILITY
Arbitration is probably as old as human society.12 As early as the thirteenth
century, merchants in England were resolving their disputes outside the common
law.13 In the early days of the Republic merchants in England and America
voluntarily submitted matters of trade to arbitration, preferring this dispute resolution
process over the common law courts. This preference continued well into the
nineteenth century.14 Despite its historical legitimacy as a private process for dispute
resolution, early English judicial decisions demonstrate reluctance to enforce private
agreements. The earliest judicial hostility15 reflected a concern for the defense of
judges’ turf. This concern was first articulated in a 1746 decision by a King’s Bench
court in a ruling proclaiming that such agreements wrongly “oust” properly
constituted courts of their jurisdiction.16 Commentators have advanced two primary
reasons for this “ouster doctrine.” The first suggested a concern for the lack of
procedural safeguards that could potentially result in a miscarriage of justice. The
second, more cynical theory, opined judicial reluctance to enforce arbitration
agreements on greed, arguing that private arbitration was seen as an economic threat
to English judges, whose incomes often depended on the fees from disputants. In
England, Parliament responded to commercial interests as early as 1684 by enacting
an arbitration statute authorizing judicial enforcement of properly executed
arbitration agreements. The ouster doctrine traveled across the Atlantic and
remained the common law rule in the United States until the early twentieth

12

See generally Sabra A. Jones, Historical Development of Commercial Arbitration in the
United States, 12 MINN. L. REV. 240, 242-43 (1928) (reporting that arbitration was practiced
in Athens and Rome).
13

See JULIUS H. COHEN, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE LAW 2 (1918) (quoting thenSenator Elihu Root’s address to the American Bar Association in 1914); Soia Mentschikoff,
Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 854-55 (1961).
14
See generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW: 17801860 (1977).
15

In this article the phrase “hostility” refers to enforcement of agreements to arbitrate.
Judicial doctrine was generally not “hostile” to enforcing completed arbitration awards. See
Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 983 (2d Cir. 1942); see also
IAN R. MACNEIL, AMERICAN ARBITRATION LAW: REFORMATION-NATIONALIZATIONINTERNALIZATION 20 (1992) (reporting that prior to an arbitration award, one party could
unilaterally revoke the arbitrator’s authority, even after the arbitration hearing); Thomas E.
Carbonneau, The Reception of Arbitration in United States Law, 40 ME. L. REV. 263, 267
(1988) (noting that at one time courts in the United States would not enforce an agreement to
arbitrate until the arbitrator had issued the award).
16

Kill v. Hollister, 95 Eng. Rep. 532 (K.B. 1746).
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century.17 Judges adopted that hostility with little examination.18 Most American
courts deemed such agreements to arbitrate as revocable at the will of either party.19
In America, purely executory agreements to arbitrate had little contractual force.
Parties could refuse to honor such agreements and could revoke them at any time.
The doctrine of specific performance did not apply to agreements to arbitrate
existing or future disputes. Common law courts did not recognize arbitration
agreements as grounds to bar common law actions.20 In theory, damages could be
sought for breach of contract, but judicial hostility prevailed and only nominal
damages were recognized.21
Despite American courts’ refusal to apply contract law to enforce arbitration
agreements, many parties submitted disputes to arbitration on a voluntary basis.
Arbitration satisfied a need for expert, speedy, informal and inexpensive resolution
of disputes while litigation did not. Merchants of many trade types preferred
arbitration over common law suits, however enforcement of the agreement to
arbitrate depended on mutual assent.(add a fotenote) If a trade member wanted to
ignore the agreement, as Tobey v. County of Bristol reveals, the party seeking
enforcement would get no help from the courts. General contract law was
inapplicable. In the 1920s, business and commercial entities (frustrated by the
court’s unwillingness to order specific performance of agreements to arbitrate)
joined to lobby for legislative change.22 It was around this time that legislatures
began to enact laws specifically aimed at the enforcement of arbitration agreements.
III. THE FAA: BEYOND NEUTRALITY - EVOLUTION OF THE “SUPER
ENFORCEABLE” ARBITRATION CONTRACT
The FAA was passed in 1925 to counter this judicial mistrust of arbitration.23
Congress enacted the United States Arbitration Act (USAA) (now called the Federal
Arbitration Act or FAA).24 The original assumption was that the FAA applied only

17

See CARRIE J. MENKEL-MEADOW
ADVERSARIAL MODEL 481 (2005).

ET AL.,

DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND

THE

18

See LAURA J. COOPER ET AL., ADR IN THE WORKPLACE 31 (2000) (“Traditionally, courts
have been hostile to arbitration, viewing it as an institution that would deprive the courts of
their jurisdiction.”).
19

See, e.g., Kulukundis Shipping Co., 126 F.2d at 979 (providing an opinion summarizing
the common law); see also United States Asphalt Ref. Co. v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co.,
222 F. 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1915).
20
See Tobey v. County of Bristol, 23 Fed. Cas. 1313 (1845); Kulukundis Shipping Co.,
126 F.2d at 983.
21

See Munson v. Straits of Dover S.S Co., 102 F. 926, 928 (2d Cir. 1900) (awarding only
nominal damages for a breach of agreement to arbitrate reasoning that judicial process is
“theoretically at least, the safest and best devised by the wisdom and experience of mankind”).
22
See generally Julius H. Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law,
12 VA. L. REV. 265 (1926) (summarizing the business interests at the time behind the
movement for early statutory reform).
23

See Allied-Bruce Terminex Cos., 513 U.S. at 270.

24

9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1999).
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in federal courts.25 If this assumption proved true, states would remain free to refuse
contractual enforcement of agreements to arbitrate by legislation or interpretation of
state common law. Application of the FAA in state courts was seen as a threat to the
many state common and statutory laws hostile to arbitration. This view was
grounded in the fact that the FAA had been broadly interpreted to apply to any
“contract evidencing a transaction in commerce.”26
We begin by reviewing the somewhat innocuous language of Section 2 of the
FAA which provides:
A written provision in any . . . contract evidencing a transaction involving
commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of
such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any
part thereof, . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract.27
The passage of the act did not immediately translate into judicial acceptance or
adoption of the mandate that arbitration contracts were to be enforced “save upon
such grounds that exist at law or equity for the revocation of any contract.”28
Following the enactment of the FAA the Supreme Court and lower courts remained
somewhat suspicious (if not hostile) to arbitration. Courts failed to uniformly
embrace the mandate of Section 2 that arbitration contracts were to be “enforceable”
and treated like “any contract” and often hesitated to grant motions to compel
arbitration in circumstances they felt were inappropriate.
It would take several decades for the Supreme Court to embrace arbitration and
to fully support a contractual approach in matters involving arbitration. In 1983, the
Court in Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp. reaffirmed the
contractual approach in a case involving an arbitration clause in a construction
contract.29 The Court also went a step beyond encouraging mere neutrality by
creating a presumption in favor of arbitration,30 Justice Brennan opined for the
majority:
[Q]uestions of arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for
the federal policy favoring arbitration . . . The Arbitration Act establishes
that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of
arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the

25

IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW §§ 10.2, 10.3.1, 10.3.2 (1995).

26

9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000); See generally Allied-Bruce Terminex Cos., 513 U.S. at 269-70
(demonstrating that the scope of the FAA’s coverage has been broadly interpreted to
correspond with Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001) (interpreting FAA’s § 1 exclusion to apply only to transportation
workers, thereby limiting the role states could play in regulating arbitration).
27

9 U.S.C. § 2.

28

Id.

29

Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983).

30

Id. at 24-25.
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problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an
allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.31
It is significant to note that although Justice Brennan in the majority opinion
referenced this policy “favoring” arbitration as if it were a longstanding judicial
philosophy, the policy is nowhere to be found in previous Court decisions;32
however, post-Cone it was cited as settled law.33 Despite this articulated
presumption, the contract approach was not uniformly applied in all cases involving
arbitration clauses. However, by 1984 the Court reiterated its policy favoring
arbitration and struck a final blow to the lack of enforcement of arbitration contracts
by the states. In Southland Corp. v. Keating,34 the Court took on the issue of whether
a state could refuse to enforce an agreement to arbitrate between a franchisor and
franchise notwithstanding a state law invalidating such agreements. The Court held
that the FAA created a federal body of substantive law as part of its “national
policy”35 favoring arbitration.
For decades, special defenses were utilized by courts refusing to compel
arbitration of statutory claims. In Wilko v. Swan,36 a buyer of securities sued a seller
for fraud under Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933. The Supreme Court
refused to compel arbitration despite the arbitration clause in the sales contract,
holding instead that the clause was void as an invalid waiver of the substantive law
created by the securities statute. Lower courts subsequently applied this special
“public policy” defense to enforcement of arbitration agreements under the FAA
when statutory claims were at issue.37
Three decades later, between 1985 and 1989, the Court in the Mitsubishi
Trilogy, approved compulsory arbitration in statutory claims involving securities,
antitrust and racketeering; they explicitly overruled Wilko:38 “[W]e are well past the
time when judicial suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and of the competence
of arbitral tribunals inhibited the development of arbitration as an alternative means
of dispute resolution.”39 The Mitsubishi Court, in an attempt to put an end to any
lingering “judicial suspicion” of arbitration, again interpreted the FAA as creating a
31

Id.

32

See generally Jean Sternlight, Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference For Binding
Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 660-61 (1996) (characterizing this enunciated philosophy
as a “myth” swayed or at least influenced by a desire to conserve judicial resources).
33

See infra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.

34

Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1984).

35

Id. at 10-11.

36
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
37

See, e.g., A. & E. Plastik Pak Co. v. Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d 710, 716 (9th Cir. 1968);
Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. J. P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 827-28 (2d Cir. 1968).
38
See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 479-80, 486
(1989); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238, 242 (1987); Mitsubishi,
473 U.S. at 616, 640.
39

Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 626-27.
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presumption of arbitrability with regard to whether arbitration is permitted under a
particular statutory claim.40
The 1991 landmark decision in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.41
illustrates just how far the Court had come since its refusal to apply the FAA to
contracts involving the Securities Act in Wilko. In Gilmer, the Supreme Court held
that in the employment context, it would enforce a pre-dispute arbitration agreement
signed by a non-union employee as a condition of employment when a federal
statutory employment claim was at issue.42
Although the holding in Gilmer
expressly applied only to claims brought under the federal Age Discrimination and
Employment Act (ADEA), “the lower federal courts have compelled arbitration of
claims arising under virtually all federal employment statues, state employment
statutes, and state common law doctrines.”43 This 1991 decision “precipitated a
veritable stampede by employers to fashion agreements with their employees to
submit employment disputes to binding arbitration.”44 This “stampede” has
continued in the employment field and has expanded into all areas of consumer
law.45
In summary, it can be argued that the current arbitration contract construction
policy is the child of the federal judiciary’s relentless efforts to counteract historical
hostility to arbitration. Although the gestation of this policy took decades, by the
mid-1990s Justice Trieweiler of the Montana Supreme Court, in upholding a state
law which conditioned enforceability of arbitration clauses on compliance with a
“first page” notice requirement, spoke for many state court judges when he wrote in
a specially concurring opinion that the federal judiciary “perverted the purpose of the
FAA from one to accomplish judicial neutrality, to one of open hostility to any
legislative effort[s]” designed to promote contractual fairness when arbitration
clauses were involved.46 In 1996, the Supreme Court invalidated this Montana
notice statute in Casarotto;47 however, Justice Trieweiler’s opinion published in
1994 reflects the tension between state and federal judges on this issue at that time:
To those federal judges who consider forced arbitration as the panacea for
their “heavy case loads” and who consider the reluctance of state courts to
buy into the arbitration program as a sign of intellectual inadequacy, I
would like to explain a few things . . . In Montana, we are reasonably
civilized and have a sophisticated system of justice which has evolved
40
Id. (holding that the statutory claim will be presumed arbitrable absent explicit evidence
that Congress intended to preclude arbitration under the statue in question).
41

Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).

42

Id. at 35.

43

COOPER ET AL., supra note 18, at 557.

44
William M. Howard, Arbitrating Employment Discrimination Claims: Do You Really
Have To? Do You Really Want To?, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 255, 255 (1994).
45

See infra Part IV.

46

Casarotto v. Lombardi, 886 P.2d 931, 941 (Mont. 1994) (Trieweiler, J., specially
concurring), rev’d, Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996).
47

Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 688-89.
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over time and which we continue to develop for the primary purpose of
assuring fairness to those people who are subject to its authority . . .What I
would like the people in the federal judiciary, especially at the appellate
level, to understand is that due to their misinterpretation of congressional
intent when it enacted the Federal Arbitration Act, and due to their naive
assumption that arbitration provisions and choice of law provisions are
knowingly bargained for, all of these procedural safeguards and
substantive laws are easily avoided by any party with enough leverage to
stick a choice of law and an arbitration provision in its pre-printed
contract and require the party with inferior bargaining power to sign it . . .
[I]f the Federal Arbitration Act is to be interpreted as broadly as some of
the decisions from our federal courts would suggest, then it presents a
serious issue regarding separation of powers. What these interpretations
do, in effect, is permit a few major corporations to draft contracts
regarding their relationship with others that immunizes them from
accountability under the laws of the states where they do business, and by
the courts in those states . . . These insidious erosions of state authority
and the judicial process threaten to undermine the rule of law as we know
it . . . Nothing in our jurisprudence appears more intellectually detached
from reality and arrogant that the lament of federal judges who see this
system of imposed arbitration as “therapy for their crowded dockets.”
These decisions have perverted the purpose of the FAA from one to
accomplish judicial neutrality, to one of open hostility to any legislative
effort to assure that unsophisticated parties to contracts of adhesion at
least understand the rights they are giving up.48
Other voices questioned the broad interpretation of the FAA;49 however, the
Supreme Court continued down the path articulated by Justice Brennan in Cone50
when Casarotto reached it in 1996.
IV. DOCTOR’S ASSOCIATES, INC. V. CASAROTTO
In Casarotto, the Supreme Court again enhanced enforceability of arbitration
agreements when it held that the preemptive scope of the FAA applied to the
Montana statute. Montana law, at the time, declared “an arbitration clause
unenforceable unless ‘[n]otice that [the] contract is subject to arbitration’ is ‘typed in

48

Casarotto, 886 P.2d at 939-41.

49
See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminex Cos., 513 U.S. at 282 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“I
have long adhered to the view, discussed below, that Congress designed the Federal
Arbitration Act to apply only in federal courts.”); Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute
Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer Contracts: A Call for Reform, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1237
(2001); Anne Brafford, Arbitration Clauses in Consumer Contracts of Adhesion: Fair Play or
Trap for the Weak and Unwary?, 21 IOWA J. CORP. L. 331 (1996); Margaret M. Harding, The
Clash Between Federal and State Arbitration Law and the Appropriateness of Arbitration as a
Dispute Resolution Process, 77 NEB. L. REV. 397 (1998); Johanna Harrington, To Litigate or
Arbitrate? No Matter—The Credit Card Industry is Deciding for You, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL.
101 (2001).
50

Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 1.
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underlined capital letters on the first page of the contract.’”51 The arbitration clause
in Casarotto did not comply with the statute because it was on page nine and in
ordinary type. This case is a prime example of lower courts resisting the efforts of
the Supreme Court to support binding arbitration in all areas of law. The case
history shows that the Montana Supreme Court twice voided the arbitration clause
before the Supreme Court made a final ruling that the clause was invalid.
Casarotto involved a Subway sandwich shop standard form franchise agreement
requiring all claims relating to the agreement to be arbitrated by the American
Arbitration Association in Connecticut. When a dispute arose, the franchisees
brought suit in a Montana state court, alleging state-law contract and tort claims.
The franchisor sought to stop litigation pending arbitration pursuant to the arbitration
clause on page nine of the agreement and successfully moved to stay the state court
litigation pending arbitration. The Montana Supreme Court reversed the stay
holding that the Montana Statute rendered the arbitration clause unenforceable. The
question for the Supreme Court was whether Montana’s law was compatible with the
FAA or whether it conflicted and was therefore displaced or preempted by the
federal statute. The Supreme Court reversed the Montana court’s decision finding
preemption “because the State’s law conditions the enforceability of arbitration
agreements on compliance with a special notice requirement not applicable to
contracts generally.”52 However, the Court also affirmed its contract approach to
arbitration agreements holding:
Section 2 of the FAA provides that written arbitration agreements “shall
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for revocation of any contract.” 9 U. S. C. § 2 . . .
(citations omitted) . . . the text of § 2 declares that state law may be
applied “if that law arose to govern issues concerning the validity,
revocability, and enforceability of contracts generally.” (citation omitted) .
. . Thus, generally applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or
unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements
without contravening § 2. (citations omitted).53
Thus, while it can be argued that state regulatory power to protect consumers from
unintentionally waiving access to the courts was severely curtailed in Casarotto54
and that the number of standard form arbitration agreements would grow,55 this

51

Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 683 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114(4) (1995)).

52

See id. at 687.

53

Id. at 686-87.

54

David Ling, Preserving Fairness in Arbitration Agreements: States’ Options after
Casarotto, 2 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 193, 205 (1997) (“The Supreme Court’s decision in
Casarotto, then, does have a largely eviscerating effect on state attempts to regulate arbitration,
even those that are geared towards leveling the playing field between individuals with
relatively little bargaining power and larger, more powerful corporations, employers, and
franchisers.”).
55
See Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability After Doctor’s Associates, Inc.
v. Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1001, 1001, note 3 (1996) (referencing growth of
standard form arbitration agreements signed by consumers, employees, and others).
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article looks at how courts have applied the “generally applicable” contract defense
of unconscionability in the wake of Casarotto.
The FAA “preclude[s] States from singling out arbitration provisions for suspect
status, requiring instead that such provisions be placed ‘upon the same footing as
other contracts.’”56 In the wake of Casarotto, state courts were on notice that even
seemingly benign regulatory laws would not be tolerated unless the laws applied to
all contracts. Commentators pronounced the demise of state regulatory action aimed
at protecting citizens from unfair adhesion clauses compelling arbitration.57
Concurrently, employers as well as retail sellers of goods continued their
“stampede”58 in fashioning pre-dispute binding arbitration agreements drafted to
cover every imaginable cause of action arising out of employment or arising under
consumer law. Many courts have replied by resurrecting the equitable doctrine of
unconscionability in response to the proliferation of aggressively drafted standard
form pre-dispute arbitration clauses. This article looks at this judicial response.
Perhaps, the strong endorsement of the contract approach to arbitration law in
Casarotto is at least partly responsible for “unconscionability found” in state and
federal decisional law in the decade immediately following the Supreme Court’s
decision.
V. UNCONSCIONABILITY FOUND UNDER STATE LAW
While Casarotto on one hand may have significantly reduced states’ power to
regulate arbitration through legislation, it also stands expressly for the proposition
that an arbitration provision may be struck down if it is unconscionable.59 “Because
unconscionability is a defense to contracts generally and does not single out
arbitration agreements for special scrutiny, it is also a valid reason not to enforce an
arbitration agreement under the FAA.”60 Upon a finding of unconscionability, state

56

Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 687 (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 511
(1974)).
57
Ling, supra note 54, at 193-94 (“The [Casarotto] [c]ourt’s ruling likely will eviscerate
existing state legislation aimed at establishing a minimum threshold of fairness in both the
formation and the performance of arbitration agreements . . . .”); see also Henry C. Strickland,
The Federal Arbitration Act’s Interstate Commerce Requirement: What’s Left for State
Arbitration Law?, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 385 (1992). Charles Knapp states:
The United States Supreme Court, followed loyally, and for the most part
enthusiastically, by the lower federal courts, has made the strong preference for
enforcement of arbitration clauses a matter of federal preemption, so broadly and
firmly expressed as to make it nearly impossible for even those state judges or state
legislatures who might be so moved to exercise any restraining influence at all.
Knapp, supra note 3, at 776-77.
58

Howard, supra note 44, at 255.

59

See Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 681; see also Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky
Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 (1995); Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138 (Cal. Ct. App.
1997).
60

Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 279 F.3d 889, 895 (9th Cir. 2002).
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courts often have discretion to deny motions to compel arbitration in whole or in
part.61
The doctrine of unconscionability post-Casarotto is central to assessing the
validity of mandatory arbitration clauses when they are challenged under state
contract law. The topic of mandatory arbitration clauses was the subject of
discussion in June of 2003 when one hundred and twenty judges representing 31
states convened for the Roscoe Pound Institute for State Appellate Court Judges.62
The increasing role that state courts play in policing arbitration agreements in the
wake of the Supreme Court pro-arbitration decisions was discussed. Judge
Trieweiler, the appellate court judge twice reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Casarotto noted:
[W]hat we do cling to in Montana are notions of fairness. And we also
cling to the notion that if those traditional forms of protection aren’t
provided by the courts, they are simply not going to be provided. And
included in the traditional notions of fairness are access to the courts, the
right to trial by jury, and the right to reasonable discovery, so that you can
develop your factual record. We consider the rules of evidence important
to fairness. We consider the right to appeal, so that one can be sure that
the decision was based on the law and the facts, important to principles of
fairness. And we believe that public courts, where you don’t pay for the
judge, are important to the enforcement of the principles of fairness.
We have also taken the Supreme Court at face value. We have taken it
to mean what it says when it always points out to us that those grounds
that exist at law and equity for the revocation of any contract can be
applied to binding, pre-dispute arbitration agreements.
So, recently in Kloss, we held, as we have always held, that all
contracts of adhesion have to be scrutinized for fairness, and they have to
be scrutinized for whether they measure up to the reasonable expectations
of the parties who have the least bargaining power. And even if they do,
they have to be scrutinized as to whether they are unconscionable. We set
forth in Kloss what kinds of facts are essential in developing a record of
unconscionability. We also said, in the concurring opinion in Kloss, that
we will consider whether there has been a valid waiver of the
constitutional right---the fundamental right in Montana---to trial by jury. .

61
See, e.g., Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 696-97
(Cal. 2000) (stating that California law grants courts the discretion to sever an unconscionable
provision or to refuse to enforce the contract in its entirety, and in exercising this discretion
courts look to whether “the central purpose of the contract is tainted with illegality” or “the
illegality is collateral to [its] main purpose”).
62

See, e.g., POUND CIVIL JUSTICE INSTITUTE, THE PRIVATIZATION OF JUSTICE? MANDATORY
ARBITRATION, REPORT OF THE 2003 FORUM FOR STATE APPELLATE COURT JUDGES, 155 (2006),
[hereinafter POUND] The report of the 2003 forum for state appellate court judges reports that,
“[o]ne standard of assessing the validity of contracts that judges discussed in detail was
whether the terms of the contract were unconscionable. Several suggested that was a standard
used regularly to overturn mandatory arbitration clauses.” Id.
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. . I think the reason we are able to apply the jury trial waiver standards in
Montana is because we have done it in other contexts.63
Other generally applicable contract defenses such as fraud, duress, or failure to meet
the reasonable expectations of the parties also come into play as part of the
unconscionability analysis.64 This article explores how contractual defenses are
applied by courts refusing to enforce pre-dispute arbitration clauses in the last
decade. Courts have not found that arbitration clauses are unconscionable in general;
such a finding would be plainly contrary to the Federal Arbitration Act; however, a
new type of precedent under arbitration jurisprudence is emerging as a viable
defense to arbitration contracts today. “If nothing else, the arbitration wars have
brought unconscionability back to center stage.”65
State contract law is not expressly preempted by the FAA.66 In significant dicta,
the Supreme Court in 1996 explained that “state law, whether of legislative or
judicial origin, is applicable [to arbitration agreements] if that law arose to govern
issues concerning the validity, revocability, and enforceability of contracts
generally.”67 However, “[o]rdinary principles of unconscionability may manifest
themselves in forms peculiar to the arbitration context”68 and adhesion theory
peculiar to arbitration and the FAA is developing.
Most state courts will examine both procedural and substantive unconscionability
when an arbitration clause is involved.69 Procedural unconscionability involves
inquiry into the contract formation process. This involves consideration of the nature
of the negotiation process and the disclosure of arbitration terms focusing on
concepts like “oppression” or “surprise” due to “unequal bargaining power.”70
Substantive unconscionability involves an inquiry into the actual terms of the clause.

63
Id. at 37-38 (quoting Kloss v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 54 P.3d 1 (Mont. 2002), cert.
denied, 538 U.S. 956 (2003)).
64

See infra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.

65

See Knapp, supra note 3 at 797 n.120.

66

9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (providing that the arbitration agreement shall be “valid,
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract”).
67

Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 (1987) (reiterating the preemption doctrine created
in Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), in holding that the FAA preempted
California Labor Code § 229).
68

Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 693.

69

See, e.g., Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding
that Pennsylvania law requires both procedural and substantive unconscionability to render a
contract term unenforceable); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form
Contracts and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1251-78 (2003) (concluding that
most courts require both procedural and substantive unconscionability to exist before refusing
to enforce an unambiguous contract provision).
70

Armendariz, P.3d at 690 (quoting A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d
473, 486-87 (1982)).
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This involves consideration of the fairness evoked by the terms themselves.71 Courts
focus on “overly harsh” or “one sided” results in finding substantive
unconscionability.72 While most courts require a showing of both procedural and
substantive unconscionability, the two factors are often treated as playing against one
another in a sliding scale relationship.73 For example, the California Supreme Court
has stated that “the more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less
evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that
the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.”74 In a number of other jurisdictions, a
similar doctrine is set forth in slightly different terms.75
The focus is on “fairness” and the defense of unconscionability will only succeed
when circumstances surrounding the negotiation of the clause, the terms in the
clause, or its contemplated implementation, render it particularly egregious. While
the doctrine of unconscionability is a standard contract defense and has been written
about extensively elsewhere,76 factors unique to mandatory pre-dispute arbitration
clauses are evolving from decisions involving employment contracts and consumer
contracts under the FAA.77 However, it may be helpful to briefly address the
unconscionability analysis forming the basis for current law.
The dictionary definition of “conscience” may be a good place to start. Most
dictionaries define the word “conscience” in terms of morality and ethics. A typical
definition: “The awareness of a moral or ethical aspect to one’s conduct together
with the urge to prefer right over wrong.”78 When we append the prefix “un”79 we
come up with a “contrary” or “opposite” meaning or the urge to prefer “wrong over
right.” One definition of “unconscionability” is “[b]eyond prudence or reason.”80
71

See generally, Arthur A. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code—The Emperor’s New
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 487 (1967) (“Hereafter, to distinguish the two interests, I
shall often refer to bargaining naughtiness as ‘procedural unconscionability,’ and to evils in
the resulting contract as ‘substantive unconscionability.’”).
72

Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 690.

73

See, e.g., Kinney v. United Healthcare Servs. Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 348, 352 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1999) (discussing a “sliding scale” inquiry where a significant showing of either
substantive or procedural unconscionability could render a provision unenforceable); W.
DAVID S. LAWSON, BINDING PROMISES: THE LATE 20TH CENTURY REFORMATION OF CONTRACT
LAW 142 (1996) (noting that a sliding scale is utilized by most courts).
74

Armendariz, 6 P3d at 690.

75

See, e.g., Eagle v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 809 N.E.2d 1161, 1170-72 (Ohio Ct. App.
2004) (applying Ohio law, the court outlines a two prong test for determining
unconscionability, explaining “procedural” and “substantive” unconscionability under contract
law).
76

See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV.
741, 771-73 (1982); M. P. Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L. J. 757,
763-68 (1969).
77

See infra notes 90-158 and accompanying text.

78

THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 391 (4th ed. 2000).

79

Id. at 1869.

80

Id. at 1873.
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How do courts go about fashioning a legal standard for applying this elusive concept
on a case-by-case basis?
Common law courts traditionally left evaluation of the fairness of the bargain to
the contracting parties. Courts of Equity have historically refused to enforce
agreements so unfair as to shock the conscience of the courts.81 The equitable
doctrine of unconscionability applies to contracts generally82 and to contracts for the
sale of goods specifically;83 however, “the definition of unconscionability remains
sketchy and elusive.”84 How does a judge determine whether a particular agreement
“shocks the conscience of the court?” Irving Younger described the two-step
analysis as an imprecise process which ultimately “add(s) up merely to the
proposition that a judge’s conscience is his only guide.”85 This two-step analytical
process was described early on as an inquiry into “procedural” and “substantive”
unconscionability.86
Procedural unconscionability or “bargaining naughtiness”87 traditionally involves
the consideration of several factors including: (1) disparity of bargaining between the
parties; (2) whether the parties had an opportunity to read and understand the terms;
(3) whether the terms were in legalese or fine print; and (4) whether exploitation of a
poor or uneducated party took place.88 Determining substantive unconscionability or
the “evils in the resulting contract”89 involves weighing the disparity of exchange in
light of the entire bargain as well as assessing the reasonableness of the individual
terms.90 In light of the overall unconscionability analysis, adhesion contracts often
receive scrutiny for fairness because by definition they involve a party with little
bargaining power. In this context, courts faced with boilerplate arbitration clauses
involving individual employment or consumer contracts are crafting modern
adhesion law under the FAA.91

81

See generally Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80, 83 (3d Cir. 1948) (“That
equity does not enforce unconscionable bargains is too well established to require citation.”).
82

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981).

83

See U.C.C. § 2-302 (1998) (authorizing refusal to enforce “unconscionable” contracts in
whole or part without specifically defining the term).
84
Susan A. Fitzgibbon, Teaching Important Contracts Concepts: Teaching
Unconscionability through Agreements to Arbitrate Employment Claims, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
1401, 1405 (2000).
85

Irving Younger, A Judge’s View of Unconscionability, 13 JUDGES’ J. 32, 33 (1974).

86

See Leff, supra note 71.

87

Id.

88

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. d (1981).

89

Leff, supra note 71, at 487.

90

Id.

91

See Korobkin, supra note 69 (“[A]rbitration jurisprudence is a good source of insight
into the unconscionability doctrine.”).
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While the judicially created unconscionability analysis generally begins with a
determination of whether the clause at hand is one of adhesion,92 it does not end
there. The Supreme Court stated in fairly strong language in Gilmer that the “mere
inequality in bargaining power” that often exists between employers and employees
would not render an agreement to arbitrate unenforceable.93 Post Casarotto, courts
began to apply general principles of contract law unconscionability with increasing
frequency in the arbitration context. California’s highest court led the way by
reaffirming its view that “ordinary principles of unconscionability may manifest
themselves in forms peculiar to the arbitration context” and further holding that
“[o]ne such form is an agreement requiring arbitration for the claims of the weaker
party but a choice of forum for the claims of the stronger party.”94 In Armendariz v.
Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., the court considered the defense of
unconscionability as it applies “to any type of arbitration imposed on the employee
by the employer as a condition of employment, regardless of the type of claim being
arbitrated.”95 Armendariz involved two employees claiming wrongful termination
based on sexual harassment and discrimination. Both had signed pre-dispute
arbitration clauses in conjunction with application for employment forms. The
arbitration provisions mandated arbitration for employees who file claims against the
employer, but the employer was free to sue in court. The clauses signed expressly
limited all “remedies for violation of the terms, conditions or covenants of
employment . . . to a sum equal to the wages . . . earned from the date of any
discharge until the date of the arbitration award.”96 Reinstatement and even
injunctive relief were expressly excluded.97 The court applied the following
unconscionability analysis to the facts of the case.
Step number one in the analysis is to determine (under applicable state law)
whether the contract is one of adhesion. Armendariz, applied a sliding scale test
examining the challenged arbitration provisions for both procedural and substantive
unconscionability.98 The phrase “contract of adhesion” is defined differently from
state to state. Under California law, “The term [contract of adhesion] signifies a
standardized contract, which, imposed and drafted by the party of superior
bargaining strength, relegates to the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere
to the contract or reject it.”99 In California, the court in Circuit City v. Adams, on
remand from the Supreme Court, held that a finding that the arbitration clause is

92
Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 689 (“Unconscionability analysis begins with an inquiry into
whether the contract is one of adhesion.”).
93

Gilmer, 500 U. S. at 33.

94

See Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 693 (quoting its prior holding in Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60
Cal. Rptr. 2d 138 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997)).
95

Id. at 689.

96

Id. at 675.

97

Id.

98

Id. at 689-90.

99

Id. at 689 (citing Neal v. State Farm Ins. Cos., 10 Cal. Reptr. 781, 784 (Cal. Ct. App.
1961)).
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within a contract of adhesion may be sufficient to render it procedurally
unconscionable.100
Step number two in the analysis is to “then determine whether ‘other factors are
present which, under established legal rules – legislative or judicial – operate to
render it [unenforceable].’”101 The court then went on to delineate two non-exclusive
judicial limitations on the enforcement of adhesion contracts, one of which the court,
by implication, indicates is peculiar to employment contracts:
“Generally speaking, there are two judicially imposed limitations on the
enforcement of adhesion contracts or provisions thereof. The first is that
such a contract or provision which does not fall within the expectations of
the weaker party or ‘adhering’ party will not be enforced against him. The
second – a principle of equity applicable to all contracts generally – is that
a contract or provision, even if consistent with the reasonable expectations
of the parties, will be denied enforcement if, considered in its context, it is
unduly oppressive or ‘unconscionable.’” Subsequent cases have referred
to both the “reasonable expectations” and the “oppressive” limitations as
being aspects of unconscionability.102
Thus, the unconscionability defense may be predicated upon a variety of factors and
is a case sensitive analysis.103 “It’s so fact-patterned based on circumstances, which
means that factors and the criteria shift every time you have a different set of
circumstances.”104 The fact that traits specific to the very nature of the arbitration
agreement itself come into play does not detract from the general unconscionability
analysis mandated by Casarotto and followed by state courts today.105 A
nonexclusive list would include: (1) a finding of an adhesive arbitration clause;106 (2)
a finding of a term violating the “reasonable expectations” of the weaker bargaining
party;107 or (3) a finding of “oppressive” limitations even when the “reasonable

100

See Adams, 279 F.3d at 893, cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1112 (2002) (revealing that the
Ninth Circuit had the last word when finding the arbitration scheme unconscionable under
standards of state law).
101

Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 689 (citing Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165 (Cal.

1981)).
102

Id.

103

Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris, No. A-44 September Term 2005, 2006 WL 2277984, at
*4 (N.J. Aug. 9, 2006) (stating “The defense of unconscionability, specifically, calls for a factsensitive analysis in each case, even when a contract of adhesion is involved.”).
104

POUND supra note 62, at 115.

105

But cf. Jeffery W. Stempel, Arbitration, Unconscionability, and Equilibrium: The
Return of Unconscionability Analysis as a Counterweight to Arbitration Formalism, 19 OHIO
ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 757, 804, 809-10 (2004) (concluding that courts generally police
arbitration agreements through a “paint by numbers” analysis citing traits specific to
arbitration rather than by applying an “unconscionability norm”).
106

Adams, 279 F.3d at 893.

107

Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 689.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol54/iss3/3

16

2006]

UNCONSCIONABILITY FOUND

265

expectations” of the weaker bargaining party are satisfied.108 In Armendariz, the
court held that the “unconscionable one-sidedness” of the agreement in the absence
of justification rendered the arbitration clause unenforceable.109
While the nature of the employee/employer relationship in a particular case plays
a major factor in whether courts will compel arbitration, the defense has been
successful in cases involving both low110 and high level employees.111 An arbitration
agreement may also be found unconscionable even in the absence of a finding of a
contract of adhesion.112
This contractual defense of unconscionability is an extremely fertile ground for
consumers as well as employees confronted by one-sided pre-dispute mandatory
arbitration clauses.
A significant amount of important law relating to
unconscionability is found in both the area of both employment and consumer law.
In the ten year period since the Supreme Court in Casarotto struck the blow to state
regulatory efforts to police fairness in the arbitration arena per se, many state courts
have refused to enforce all or part of arbitration clauses on unconscionability
grounds.113
Increasingly, consumers encounter pre-dispute arbitration clauses in every day
life. Binding arbitration clauses are part of transactions involving sales of consumer
goods,114 consumer services,115 credit card agreements,116 brokerage accounts,117

108

Id.

109

Id. at 694.

110

See, e.g., Hooters of Am., Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999) (declining to
compel bartender to arbitrate Title VII claim on grounds that employer materially breached the
agreement to arbitrate by promulgating egregiously one-sided and unfair arbitration rules);
Garrett v. Hooters-Toledo, 295 F. Supp. 2d 774 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (refusing to compel waitress
to arbitrate wrongful discharge upon a finding of procedural and substantive
unconscionability); Alexander v. Anthony Int’l, L.P., 341 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 2003) (declining
to compel employee crane operators with limited education to arbitrate wrongful discharge
claims upon finding of procedural unconscionability and substantively unconscionable time
limitation for filing claim, limitations on relief, and excessive fee arrangements); Brennan v.
Bally Total Fitness, 198 F. Supp. 2d 377, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (finding procedural
unconscionability when employer used “high pressure tactics,” “gave the employees no more
that fifteen minutes to review a sixteen-page single-spaced document,” and employee plaintiff
“was an unrepresented, single mother who was then pregnant with twins, and lacked other
adequate means of support”).
111

Stirlen, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138 (holding that an experienced executive employee is not
estopped from claiming that contract’s arbitration clause was unconscionable).
112
See Hooters, 173 F.3d at 938 (“The judicial inquiry, while highly circumscribed, is not
focused only on an examination for contractual formation defects such as a lack of mutual
consent and want of consideration.”).
113

See infra notes 114-158 and accompanying text (discussing decisions invalidating
arbitration provisions).
114
See, e.g., Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997); Brower v.
Gateway 2000, Inc., 676 N.Y.S.2d 569 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
115

See, e.g., Winig v. Cingular Wireless L.L.C., No. C 06 4297 MMC., 2006 WL 2766007
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2006).
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insurance policies,118 financial services,119 franchisor agreements,120 and even
professional legal,121 accounting122 and health care services.123 In fact, “the
possibilities for the use of arbitration in consumer contracts seem endless.”124 One
study conducted in Los Angeles with respect to a hypothetical “Joe Average”
revealed that approximately one-third of consumer transactions in his life were now
covered by arbitration clauses.125 In most states, a finding of both procedural and
substantive unconscionability is necessary for the defense to succeed.126 In just a few
states, procedural unconscionability alone will render an arbitration clause
unenforceable.127 However, such cases offer insight to the aggressive drafting and
tactics utilized in the consumer field. In one extreme case the court found procedural
unconscionability when a surgical patient (dressed in surgical garb) on her way to
surgery was asked to sign a standard form agreement without being told about the
arbitration provision.128 The arbitration clause was buried in the form and provided
for payment of all costs by the patient in the event she did not win less than one half
the amount of the damages sought in arbitration. In the event the doctor was found

116

See, e.g., Szetela v. Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).

117

See, e.g., Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 477.

118

See, e.g., State ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265 (W. Va. 2002).

119
See, e.g., Jenkins v. First Am. Cash Advance of Ga., 313 F. Supp. 2d 1370 (S.D. Ga.
2003); Flores v. Transam. Homefirst, Inc., 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002);
Williams v. Aetna Fin. Co., 700 N.E.2d 859 (Ohio 1998).
120
See, e.g., Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 683; Inv. Partners, L.P., v. Glamour Shots Licensing,
Inc., 298 F.3d 314 (5th Cir. 2002); Ticknor v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc., 265 F.3d 931 (9th Cir.
2001); We Care Hair Dev., Inc., v. Engen, 180 F.3d 838 (7th Cir. 1999).
121

See, e.g., Lau v. Antonio V. Silva, P.C., No. Civ. S-04-2351 WBS PAN (GGH) PS.,
2006 WL 2382266 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2006); Aguilar v. Lerner, 88 P.3d 24 (Cal. 2004).
122

See, e.g., McNulty v. H&R Block, Inc., 843 A.2d 1267 (Pa. 2004).

123

See, e.g., Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997); Sosa v.
Paulos, 924 P.2d 357 (Utah 1996); Broemmer v. Abortion Servs. of Phoenix, 840 P.2d 1013
(Ariz. 1992).
124

ALLAN S. RAU ET AL., PROCESSES OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS 643
(3d ed. 2002).
125
See Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to Arbitrate Through
Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience, 67 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 55, 62 (2004).
126

See Korobkin, supra note 69, at 1251-78.

127

See, e.g., Banc One Acceptance Corp. v. Hill, 367 F.3d 426, 431-32 (5th Cir. 2004)
(applying Mississippi law to strike clause due to procedural unconscionability); Wilcox v.
Valero Ref. Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 687, 691 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (applying Texas law to strike
clause due to procedural unconscionability).
128

See Sosa, 924 P.2d at 358.
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not to have committed malpractice the patient was required to pay the defendant
doctor $150 per hour for any time spent on the case, plus costs and attorney fees.129
In the consumer arena, inquiries into procedural unconscionability often focus on
whether the contract contained “fine print” or whether the seller used “highpressured” tactics in making the sale.130 Whether the party challenging arbitration
was “surprised” to find the clause compelling arbitration in the agreement is also a
factor courts take into consideration.131 In some states, the procedural prong of the
unconscionability defense is satisfied upon a finding of a contract of adhesion.132
Other states apply a much heavier burden on consumers. For example, a court
applying Michigan law stated that, “[a] contract is an adhesion contract only if the
party agrees to the contract because he has no meaningful choice to obtain the
desired goods or services elsewhere.”133 A court applying Tennessee law stated that,
“[a] contract is not adhesive merely because it is a standardized form offered on a
take-it-or-leave-it basis.”134 Other courts find that when the arbitration clause is in a
boilerplate agreement to which the consumer has no power to negotiate the terms, a
careful review of the arbitration agreement is required.135
The type of consumer transaction at issue may also influence the approach of a
particular court. The Ohio Supreme Court finds that arbitration forms in consumer
credit agreements “engender more reservations” than similar agreements in
brokerage account agreements or commercial bargaining agreements.136 Thus, while
the nature of the employer/employee relationship is central to the determination of
the enforceability of an arbitration agreement in the employment context, the nature
of the consumer transaction itself may be central to a particular court’s analysis in
129

Id. at 364 (finding the arbitration clause unenforceable on procedural unconscionability

alone).
130

See generally David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business:
Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L.
REV. 33 (1997).
131

See, e.g., Lozada v. Dale Baker Oldsmobile, Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 1087 (W.D. Mich.
2000) (finding procedural unconscionability in a typical automotive sales practice where
dealers rush customers through the paper work process, often failing to provide copies of
paperwork at the time of signing).
132

See, e.g., Ting v. AT&T, 319 F.3d 1126, 1148 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying California law
when holding that “A contract is procedurally unconscionable if it is a contract of adhesion,
i.e., a standardized contract, drafted by the party of superior bargaining strength, that relegates
to the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to the contract or reject it.”); Flores,
113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 382 (applying California law when stating that “the arbitration agreement
. . . imposed upon plaintiffs on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis . . . was a contract of adhesion and
thereby procedurally unconscionable”); McNulty, 843 A.2d at 1273 (holding that the
procedural unconscionability prong is met when “[t]he contract in question is a classic
example of an adhesion contract”).
133

See, e.g., Veal v. Orkin Exterminating Co., No. 1:00-CV-920, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4846, at *7 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 9, 2001).
134

Cooper v. MRM Inv. Co., 367 F.3d 493, 500 (6th Cir. 2004).

135

See, e.g., Williams, 700 N.E.2d 859.

136

Id. at 866.
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the consumer area.137 One area, however, in which courts have not been very
receptive to the defense, is in the “form in a box” sales of computers by Gateway.138
The use of arbitration clauses in direct sales of computers has been the subject of
considerable litigation. After the customer orders the product over the phone, the
computer eventually arrives in a box along with a copy of Gateway’s “Standard
Terms and Conditions,” which include a pre-dispute arbitration clause that governs
unless the customer returns the computer in 30 days. This clause was enforced by
the Seventh Circuit in Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.139
The inquiry into substantive unconscionability or the “evils in the resulting
contract” takes a variety of forms. Substantial precedent is developing from
consumer as well as employment cases involving unconscionability on grounds of
prohibitive arbitration fees.140 Although the United States Supreme Court in Green
Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph held that the mere risk of excessive arbitration fees
is insufficient grounds for unenforceability,141 a growing number of courts have
considered high arbitration fees as a factor in the unconscionability analysis. While
the size of the fee is relevant to the determination, whether the cost’s assessed are
beyond the consumer’s expectations is also a factor.142 Courts also consider whether
the fees conflict with the purpose of the statute before the court143 and the public
interest affected by the fee provision.144

137
Eagle, 809 N.E.2d at 1175 (noting the importance of “giving special attention to
consumer transactions involving such expensive products as automobiles, which are of critical
importance to the consumer-buyer” when finding an arbitration clause in a contract involving
the purchase of an automobile unconscionable).
138

See, e.g., Hill, 105 F.3d at 1150.

139
Id. (“By keeping the computer beyond 30 days, the Hills accepted Gateway’s offer,
including the arbitration clause.”). But see Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (D.
Kan. 2000) (denying Gateway’s motion to dismiss consumer’s breach of warranty suit
reasoning that Gateway has accepted the offer “either by completing the sales transaction in
person or by agreeing to ship and/or shipping the computer to plaintiff,” the court found
Gateway’s “additional” arbitration term could only become part of the bargain if plaintiff had
“expressly” agreed to the additional term per U.C.C. § 2-207).
140

See, e.g., Pinedo v. Premium Tobacco Stores, Inc., 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 435 (Cal. Ct. App.
2000) (finding arbitration clause unconscionable when employee required to pay all fees in the
arbitration); Brower, 676 N.Y.S.2d at 574 (rejecting procedural unconscionability claim, but
holding that excessive filing fee of $4000, only $2000 of which would be refunded if
consumer prevailed, and location for arbitration rendered clause substantively unconscionable
and unenforceable); Teleserve Sys., Inc. v. MCI Telecomms. Corp., 659 N.Y.S.2d 659 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1997) (illustrating that, in a commercial case, a filing fee of $4000 plus one-half of
one percent of the amount claimed is unconscionable).
141

See Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala., 531 U.S. at 91; see also Wilkins v. Weber Motors
Fresno, Inc., No. F045545, 2005 WL 1941273, at *11 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2005) (severing
cost provision from arbitration agreement on grounds of unconscionability).
142
See Myers v. Terminix Int’l Co., 697 N.E.2d 277 (Ohio Ct. C.P. 1998) (holding
unconscionable requirement that homeowner pay nonrefundable arbitration fee, which could
range from $750 to $2000, when undisclosed in original arbitration agreement).
143
See, e.g., Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc)
(striking cost-splitting provision from employer’s arbitration clause under Ohio law because it
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Many courts find “one-way” or “non-mutual” arbitration clauses substantively
unconscionable.145 In Arnold v. United Cos. Lending Corp., the court applying West
Virginia law described the “one-way” clause as the sort of deal that might be reached
by a rabbit and a fox.146 In Arnold, the clause before the court required the consumer
to submit any claims they may have against the lender to arbitration, but permitted
the lender to go to court to collect any debts owed.147 The court concluded that the
agreement was unconscionable and unenforceable.148
As part of the overall unconscionability analysis courts cite a variety of other
factors that may alone or in part constitute substantive unconscionability. For
example, bias in the arbitration mechanism or arbitrator;149 limitations in
discovery;150 waiver of remedies;151 inconvenient arbitration forum,152 fraud,153 and
the general contract defense of lack of mutuality.154
interfered with purpose of Title VII); Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. of Colo., Inc., 163 F.3d
1230 (10th Cir. 1999) (requiring employee to pay potentially thousands of dollars to
participate in arbitration forum renders forum impractical for vindication of statutory rights).
144

See Delta Funding Corp., 2006 WL 2277984, at *4-7 (holding that an arbitration
agreement ambiguously giving unfettered discretion to shift the entire cost of arbitration may
have a “chilling effect” and would violate the right to recover discretionary attorney’s fees and
costs under consumer statutory law).
145

See, e.g., Adams, 279 F.3d at 893-94; Arnold v. United Cos. Lending Corp., 511 S.E.2d
854 (W. Va. 1998).
146
See Arnold, 511 S.E.2d at 861. But see Bess v. Check Express, 294 F.3d 1298 (11th
Cir. 2002) (holding that fact lender may litigate while borrower must arbitrate does not,
standing alone, render the arbitration clause unconscionable).
147

Arnold, 511 S.E.2d at 858.

148

Id. at 862.

149

See, e.g., Alexander, 341 F.3d 256 (holding that a 30-day time limit for filing an
arbitration claim was substantively unconscionable); Hooters, 173 F.3d at 940 (showing that
procedural overreaching was held to create a “sham unworthy even of the name arbitration”);
Graham, 623 P.2d at 177.
150

Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 683.

151

See, e.g., Wining, 2006 WL 2766007, at *5 (holding under California law that class
action/arbitration waivers are unconscionable); Kinkel v. Cingular Wireless, L.L.C., 828
N.E.2d 812 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (applying Illinois law struck down a provision waiving class
actions hidden in the middle of a long technical paragraph); Muhammad v. Rehoboth Beach,
No. A-39 September Term 2005, 2006 WL 2273448 (N.J. Aug. 9, 2006) (finding that a class
action arbitration bar acts as a waiver of remedies effectively preventing a borrower from
pursuing consumer protection rights under New Jersey law); Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265 (applying
West Virginia law the court held that language in retailer’s purchase and financing agreement
that prohibited punitive damages and class action relief was unconscionable and
unenforceable); see also Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to
Eliminate Consumer Class Actions: Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67
S.P.G. LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 78 n.13 (2004) (cataloging the “numerous courts”
holding “that the inclusion of a class action prohibition in an arbitration clause may render that
clause unconscionable”). Applying Alabama law one court held that
[a] predispute arbitration clause that forbids an arbitrator from awarding punitive
damages is void as contrary to the public policy of this State -- to protect its citizens in
certain legislatively prescribed actions from wrongful behavior and to punish the
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s utilization of the FAA over the past few decades as the
vehicle for overcoming hostility toward the arbitration process may have generated
the back lash taking place in state courts today. The aggressively drafted arbitration
clauses employees and consumers encounter daily are part of the “stampede”155 by
employers and others to fashion pre-dispute binding arbitration agreements taking
full advantage of the pro-arbitration philosophy articulated by the federal judiciary.
In the ten years since the Supreme Court eviscerated state regulatory power to police
arbitration clauses per se in Casarotto156 a new body of arbitration jurisprudence law
has developed around one of the few options left for denying enforceability of these
wrongdoer. If parties to an arbitration agreement waive an arbitrator’s ability to award
punitive damages, the door will open wide to rampant fraudulent conduct with few, if
any, legal repercussion.
Cavalier Mfg., Inc. v. Jackson, 823 So. 2d 1237, 1248 (Ala. 2001); see also Ex parte Thicklin,
824 So. 2d 723 (Ala. 2002) (holding arbitration clause in mobile dealer’s contract
unconscionable to the extent it negated possibility of punitive damages and was severed from
agreement); Bellsouth Mobility v. Christopher, 819 So. 2d 171 (Fla. Ct. App. 2002) (holding
that defendant’s arbitration clause was substantively unconscionable because class action suit
and punitive damages were prohibited); Iwen v. U.S. West Direct, 977 P.2d 989 (Mont. 1999)
(holding, in an opinion carefully worded to avoid the pitfalls of Casarotto, that a telephone
directory publisher’s contract with a customer was a contract of adhesion and substantively
unconscionable in that it was one-sided in favor of the drafter and that remedies were unduly
limited).
152
See Swain v. Auto Servs., Inc., 128 S.W.3d 103, 109 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that
“[i]n sum, the agreement to arbitrate is not unconscionable, but requiring arbitration in
Arkansas is”); Bradley v. Harris Research, Inc., 275 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a
contract requiring a California franchise to arbitrate in Utah was unconscionable under
California law); Williams, 700 N.E.2d at 866 (invalidating an arbitration agreement in
connection with a consumer loan due to its inconvenient forum and other unconscionable
provisions). But see Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Stuart, 85 F.3d 975, 980 (2d Cir. 1996)
(rejecting an unconscionability argument involving a clause requiring arbitration outside of the
state where the franchise is located).
153
See, e.g., Engalla v. Permanente Med. Group, Inc., 938 P.2d 903 (Cal. 1997) (holding
an arbitration clause misleading as to speed and other aspects).
154

See, e.g., Showmethemoney Check Cashers, Inc. v. Williams, 27 S.W.3d 361 (Ark.
2000) (refusing to enforce an arbitration provision in a “payday loan” contract that required
the borrower to submit her claims to arbitration while allowing the lender to pursue a
collection action in court); Floss v. Ryan’s Family Steak Houses, Inc., 211 F.3d 306 (6th Cir.
2000) (applying state contract principles of “illusory” promises to invalidate an arbitration
agreement requiring an employee to arbitrate his claims before a private arbitration company
that specifically reserved the right to modify all rules and procedures without notice or consent
to the employee); Armendariz, 6 P.3d at 689-99 (holding that it is unconscionable to permit an
employer to select litigation or arbitration of disputes while the employee’s only option was
arbitration); Samek v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 793 N.E.2d 62 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (holding
that a one-way arbitration clause permitting the insurer to seek a trial de novo, given an award
in excess of $20,000, was unconscionable and in violation of public policy).
155

Howard, supra note 44, at 255.

156

Casarotto, 517 U.S. at 681.
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agreements, the contractual defense of unconscionability. The unconscionability
doctrine, like the common law itself, is flexible, empowering, and well suited for
policing mandatory pre-dispute arbitration contracts for overall fairness. Over the
past decade, since the Supreme Court’s decision in Casarotto the judiciary is “not
timid about applying state law” and this state law defense.157 Whether courts are
inappropriately stretching the unconscionability defense,158 I leave for further study.

157

POUND, supra note 62, at 123 (“Judges were not timid about applying state law, and not
simply deferring to the U.S. Supreme Court or the FAA.”)
158

GOLDBERG ET AL., supra note 11, at 265.
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